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Abstract 
This paper represents one of the first attempts at quantifying the level of 
corruption in India. This was made possible by the unique website 
ipaidabribe.com which invites people who paid a bribe to record their 
experience. By choosing a specific issue - identity verification by a police 
officer prior to issuing a passport - it was able to focus on a "harassment" bribe: 
a bribe paid for something a person was legally entitled to.   Nearly half the 
persons using this website to report "passport verification" bribes were from the 
eight major Indian cities of New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore, 
Hyderabad, Pune, and Ahmedabad.  This fact is, perhaps, less an indication of 
the concentration of corruption in these cities and more of the greater propensity 
of metropolitan residents to record their grievances. Of these cities, residents of 
New Delhi had to pay the largest amounts, and residents of Ahmedabad the 
smallest, in passport verification bribes. 
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1.  Introduction 
 The fact that the level of corruption in India has become a matter of grave concern 
needs little justification. Public anger over the "scams" associated with the 2010 
Commonwealth Games and the auction of the 2G spectrum licences - which resulted in the 
jailing (pending trial) of  respectively, the chief of the Games' organising committee 
(Kalmadi) and the Minister of Telecommunications (Raja) - has led the government to 
establish a committee to draft an anti-corruption bill.
1
  Needless to say, underlying such cases 
of spectacular corruption, are a myriad instances where bribes, of various sizes, are paid to 
obtain a variety of favours. 
 In analysing such bribes it is useful to draw a distinction between "harassment" bribes 
- where one pays a bribe to receive what one is legally entitled to - and "non-harassment 
bribes" where one pays a bribe for a favour to which one is not entitled.
2
  So, for example, 
paying a tax inspector a bribe to receive an income tax refund to which one was entitled 
would constitute a harassment bribe while paying a policeman to ignore a traffic offence 
would constitute a non-harassment bribe.  A particularly egregious example of harassment 
bribes are those paid for establishing one's identity in order to obtain a passport (hereafter, 
"passport verification" bribes).  Egregious because the demand for such payment violates our 
most intimate possession - our identity - and over which we have, or should have, absolute 
control.  
 The process of obtaining a passport in India can be long and, sometimes, fraught. 
First, there is the "help" offered by touts as soon as one arrives at the passport office - Rs. 15 
for a form, Rs. 4,500 for additional pages, Rs. 6,000 for a new passport. The alternative to 
refusing such offers of help is to wait endlessly in long queues and the sheer volume of 
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 Though even the composition of this committee is not without controversy with a prominent cabinet minister 
(Pawar) being forced to resign from it because his anti-corruption credentials were viewed as suspect.  
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 See Basu (2011), Dasgupta (2009), Bardhan (1997).  
business - about 1,500 applications daily at New Delhi's regional passport office - provides 
fertile ground for touts to flourish.
3
 After the application has been lodged the police pay a 
visit to the applicant's place to verify his/her identity both directly and through neighbours.  A 
"passport verification" bribe is paid to the police officer concerned in order to ensure that the 
verification is completed without "difficulty".   
 The website www.ipaidabribe.com (created by the non-profit organisation, 
Janaagraha) provides a forum to those who have paid bribes to record their experience, and 
the bribe paid, while preserving their (and the beneficiaries) anonymity.  While bribes were 
paid to a variety of agencies (Police, Income Tax, Excise, and Customs) for a variety of 
reasons, the most well-defined purpose was that of passport verification and, indeed, of the 
8,544 cases of bribery reported till the beginning of May 2011, 1,356 cases (16%) related to 
passport verification cases.   A typical story from the website runs as follows:  "[The] police 
visited me and asked for my verification documents. On producing all the documents the 
policeman asked me to produce documents for my kid. When everything was verified he 
questioned 'what is the proof that my kid is mine'? This was so ridiculous that my wife came 
to tears".  The matter was satisfactorily resolved after he paid a Rs. 2,000 bribe. 
2. Data and Results  
 Based on the information provided in the Janagraha website on the 1,011 cases in 
which bribes were paid for passport verification (up to April 2011) we created a dataset 
consisting of: the amount of the passport verification bribe; the town or city, and the year, in 
which the bribe was paid.
4
  There were a total of 999 cases. The lowest passport verification 
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4
 A case in which a bribe of Rs. 12,000 was paid was dropped because it related to an immigration issue at New 
Delhi airport. Also dropped were two cases in which bribes of Rs.0 and Rs. 1, respectively, were paid. Lastly, 
three cases in which the bribe paid was Rs. 10,000 or more were dropped since they were not credible bribes for 
simply passport verification. 
bribe paid was Rs. 20 (in Bangalore and in Raigargh) and the highest was Rs. 6,000 in New 
Delhi.  The median bribe was Rs. 400 and the mean bribe was Rs. 544.   
 One can examine the difference in bribes paid between "cities"
5
 and non-cities: of the 
999 passport verification bribes, 546 bribes (55% of the total) were paid in "cities" and 453 
bribes (45% of the total) were paid in non-cities.  Compared to the lowest and highest bribes 
of Rs. 20 and Rs. 5,000 paid in non-cities, the lowest and highest bribes paid in cities were 
Rs. 20 and Rs. 6,000. However, the median and mean bribes in cities (respectively, Rs. 300 
and Rs. 495) were lower than the median and mean bribes in non-cities (respectively, Rs. 500 
and Rs. 603) and, furthermore, the difference between cities and non-cities in the mean 
passport verification bribe was statistically significant at the 5% level with t(997)=2.6  (Pr 
|T|>2.6=0.01).  This suggests either or both of two possibilities: first, police officers in non-
cities were bolder and more grasping in their demands compared to their counterparts in 
cities; second, compared to bribe-givers in non-cities, bribe-givers in cities were more 
prepared, at low levels of bribery, to record their experiences on the website. 
 Table 1 shows the lowest, highest, median, and mean passport verification bribes paid 
in the four metropolitan centres (New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai) and in four major 
industrial centres (Bangalore, Hyderabad, Pune, and Ahmedabad). Nearly 50% (492 of the 
999) reported cases of passport verification bribes were drawn from these eight cities and just 
two cities, Bangalore and Hyderabad, with, respectively, 219 and 88 cases, accounted for 
31% of the total number of cases.  The highest and lowest mean bribes were in New Delhi 
(Rs. 924) and in Ahmedabad (Rs. 183) and the highest and lowest median bribes were in New 
Delhi, Kolkata, and Hyderabad (Rs. 500) and in Ahmedabad (Rs. 100).   
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 Table 1: Passport Verification Bribes in Rupees by Selected Cities in India 
City Number of 
Cases 
Lowest Bribe Highest Bribe Median Bribe Mean Bribe 
New Delhi 19 100 6000 500 924 
Mumbai 65 50 4000 300 511 
Kolkata 21 50 3000 500 640 
Chennai 22 100 5000 200 593 
Bangalore 219 20 1800 300 373 
Hyderabad 88 100 4000 500 566 
Pune 40 100 2000 300 459 
Ahmedabad 18 100 500 100 183 
          
 Table 2 shows the degree of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, in the 
amounts paid by different persons in the eight cities enumerated above.  If Bi and Bj are the 
bribes paid by persons i and j, i,j=1...N, the Gini coefficient associated with the distribution 
of bribes is defined as: 
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In other words, the Gini coefficient is computed as half the mean of the difference in bribes 
between pairs of bribe givers, divided by the average bribe ().  So, G=0.45 implies that the 
difference in bribes between two givers chosen at random will be 90 percent of the average 
bribe: if =500, this difference will be Rs. 450.  The highest and lowest degrees of inequality 
in the distribution of passport verification bribes were in Chennai (Gini=0.64) and 
Ahmedabad (Gini=0.31). 
 Following Sen (1998), we argue that if   is the mean bribe, and G the degree of 
inequality in its distribution, then the level of social loss from bribery, L, may be represented 
as *(1 )L G    .  This has the intuitive interpretation that greater the inequality in the 
distribution of bribes, the higher the social loss from a given mean bribe (  ). We define * 
as the "distribution sensitive" bribe which reflects the inequality in the distribution of bribery 
experiences underlying the mean bribe,  where *≥.  The social loss from every bribe giver 
paying * would be equal that from a mean bribe of , with some paying more than  and 
others paying less.    
Table 2: Gini Coefficients for Passport Verification Bribes by Selected Cities in India 
City Number of 
Cases 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Mean Bribe Distribution-
sensitive 
bribe 
New Delhi 19 0.54 924 1,422 
Mumbai 65 0.49 511 761 
Kolkata 21 0.53 640 907 
Chennai 22 0.64 593 973 
Bangalore 219 0.35 373 504 
Hyderabad 88 0.41 566 798 
Pune 40 0.46 459 670 
Ahmedabad 18 0.31 183 240 
 
3. Conclusions 
 This paper represents one of the first attempts at quantifying the level of 
corruption in India. This was made possible by the unique website 
ipaidabribe.com which invites people who paid a bribe to record their 
experience. By choosing a specific issue - identity verification by a police 
officer prior to issuing a passport - it was able to focus on a "harassment" bribe: 
a bribe paid for something a person was legally entitled to.   Nearly half the 
persons using this website to report "passport verification" bribes were from the 
eight major Indian cities of New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore, 
Hyderabad, Pune, and Ahmedabad.  This fact is, perhaps, less an indication of 
the concentration of corruption in these cities and more of the greater propensity 
of metropolitan residents to record their grievances. Of these cities, residents of 
New Delhi had to pay the largest amounts, and residents of Ahmedabad the 
smallest, in passport verification bribes. 
References 
 Bardhan, P. (1997), "Corruption and Development: a Review of the 
Issues", Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 112, pp. 1320-1346.  
 Basu, K. (2011), Why, for a Class of Bribes, the Act of Giving a Bribe 
Should be Treated as Legal, Ministry of Finance (Government of India) 
Working Paper, 
http://finmin.nic.in/WorkingPaper/Act_Giving_Bribe_Legal.pdf. 
 Dasgupta, A. (2009), Corruption, in K. Basu (ed), Oxford Companion to 
Economics in India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sen, A.K. (1998), On Economic Inequality, Oxford University Press: 
Delhi. 
 
  
  
 
